Security controls define how the cluster operates
mTLS, cluster PKI, role checks, four-eyes approval, signed images, tenant boundaries, and hash-chained audit records apply through both interfaces on connected and fully air-gapped networks.
Every cluster connection has an authenticated identity
All internal connections use mutual TLS under a PKI owned by the cluster. Node identity is bound to its certificate. BareStax renews certificates and rejects revoked credentials as well as credentials from a former node identity.
The node agent initiates its connection to the control plane; no inbound command channel pushes shell commands into compute nodes.
User identity can come from LDAP, Active Directory, OIDC, SAML, or local accounts. Built-in TOTP remains available in an air-gapped network. BareStax asks for the second factor again when a user attempts a critical operation.
Stored secrets use envelope encryption, while passwords use a modern hash format rather than reversible form.
Six roles separate requests from approvals
Six roles define authority and keep observation, operation, approval, administration, audit, and tenant management separate.
Critical actions use four-eyes approval. Two distinct people participate, and the requester cannot approve the same request. Approval is tied to the person's identity rather than a shared account.
The approver first reads the impact, then enters the target name. BMC power actions run only as approved operations; policy decides which recovery steps run automatically and which require approval.
The console and CLI use the same API, so moving an action to the command line does not bypass its authorization or approval policy.
A hash chain protects the audit record
The immutable audit record links entries through a hash chain and supports export or delivery to a SIEM.
Tenant and workload boundaries remain explicit
Tenants cannot view one another's jobs, data, or queues. BareStax Core queues, quota, fairshare, and accounting preserve that boundary. It holds across the console, researcher portal, and CLI.
Compute-node SSH opens only for a user with a job there, apart from an explicit administrator exception.
Jobs run in Apptainer containers. Compute nodes accept only images promoted through the registry approval path and signed with an accepted cluster key. An unsigned image cannot start.
After import and scanning, two distinct people approve an image before the cluster key signs it for compute nodes.
Approved images remain read-only. User package and model caches stay in the user's persistent workspace. This separates the reviewed runtime artifact from changes a researcher retains between sessions.
Release contents have a verifiable chain of custody
The connected-side bundler collects required software into a signed, content-addressed release bundle. Upstream repositories are pinned to timestamped snapshots, and repository key fingerprints appear in the bundle's security information. The same release therefore carries the same bytes into each installation.
Transfer uses approved portable media or a data diode. Import verifies the signature, integrity, compatibility, and attached scan report before promotion. Two distinct people approve that promotion.
Release signing keys are generated in an offline environment through a recorded key ceremony. The cluster installs packages from its local repository rather than reaching outside during node installation or upgrade.
Package locks, an SBOM, a license allowlist, and reproducible builds provide reviewable inputs for the software supply chain. Institutional OCI registries and institutional counter-signatures can participate in the same image trust path.
Isolation does not reduce the operating model
No runtime path requires internet access. The control plane, node agents, console, researcher portal, CLI, local package repository, image registry, monitoring, error explanations, and runbooks remain available inside the isolated network.
Offline licensing adds no external service. BareStax sends no data outside the institution and connects to no remote server.
Identity and second-factor checks continue through local or connected institutional services. Signed release bundles cross the boundary on approved media or a data diode.